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TOWARDS A BETTER GOVERNANCE IN THE EU?
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak
The 10th EUROFRAME1 Conference on economic policy issues in 
the European Union was held in Warsaw on 24 May 2013. The Confer-
ence topic was: “Towards a better governance in the EU?”. Twelve of 
the papers given at the Conference are released in this issue of the 
Revue de l’OFCE/Debates and Policies.
The euro is a unique experience in modern economic history. Can 
a single currency be shared between countries with different cyclical 
situations, structural problems and economic strategies? Is a single 
currency consistent with independent domestic fiscal policies? In 
1992, EU countries answered ‘yes’ to these questions by signing the 
Maastricht Treaty. Starting from then, euro area governance was char-
acterized by independent domestic fiscal policies however constrained 
to fulfil several criteria (public deficit below 3% of GDP, public debt 
below 60% of GDP), a single monetary policy entrusted to an inde-
pendent central bank, the absence of public debt guarantee and fiscal 
solidarity between member states. 
This framework was a failure. Prior to the crisis, disparities widened 
between member states (MS), northern countries taking advantage of 
fixed exchange rates to implement policies aiming at gaining competi-
tiveness and increasing external surpluses, at the cost of strong wage 
and social austerity and low growth, while southern countries were 
taking advantage of low interest rates to enjoy a strong growth, based 
on housing bubbles and leading to an unsustainable external deficit. 
The European Commission and the MS were not able to implement a 
satisfactory economic policy. The European Commission pursued 
1. EUROFRAME is a network of ten independent European research institutes: WIFO (Austria), 
ETLA (Finland), OFCE (France), DIW and IFW (Germany), ESRI (Ireland), PROMETEIA (Italy), 
CPB (Netherlands), CASE (Poland), NIESR (United Kingdom).
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endless efforts against countries with higher than 3% of GDP deficits 
without seeing that the danger was coming from rising external defi-
cits in Southern countries and more generally from financial and 
housing bubbles. 
The world financial crisis was followed in Europe by a sovereign 
debt crisis in euro area countries, when financial markets realised that 
these debts were no more safe assets. Investment funds’ fears and 
speculation from many financial bodies widened interest rates 
disparities in Europe and weakened the single currency notion, since 
now euro area companies do not borrow at the same rate depending 
on their location.
European institutions and MS states tried to tackle the crisis in 
setting up new rules and institutions: 
— Fiscal discipline was strengthened through the six-pack, two-
pack and the fiscal compact. But we may argue that the current 
crisis is not due to fiscal indiscipline. The measures and mecha-
nisms introduced since the beginning of the crisis strengthen 
rules lacking economic rationale and prevent from imple-
menting appropriate fiscal stabilization policies. They will 
probably be unenforceable.
— Member states were constrained to fulfil the Stability Pact, 
through implementing fiscal austerity policies from 2011, in a 
situation of economic recession and mass unemployment. 
These policies brought the economic recovery underway to an 
end and plunged the euro area in depression again in 2012-13. 
Southern economies reduced their external imbalances, 
although through falls in domestic demand and output, and 
large increases in unemployment rates. Today these countries 
seem to be deprived of any economic and social dynamism. In 
2013, the euro area had lost almost 10 percent of GDP due to 
the crisis, without the EU institutions recommending any 
economic recovery strategy, outside fiscal austerity and liberal 
structural reforms, strategies which have failed so far to bring 
the euro area out of the crisis. 
— The surveillance of MS economic policies was strengthened and 
broadened through the introduction of a first European 
semester and of the macroeconomic imbalance procedure, 
without any true MS economic policy coordination. 
— Solidarity mechanisms between MS were introduced (EFSF, 
EFSM, ESM), the central bank intervened (SMP – securities 
market programme) or announced it would be ready to do so if 
needed (OMT programme). But the price of solidarity was high 
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for countries agreeing to receive support from the Troika, and 
this did not restore public debts unicity in the euro area.
— EU institutions now advocate further steps towards federalism 
in banking or fiscal areas (automatic transfer mechanisms, EU 
common unemployment insurance system).
In May 2013, when the EUROFRAME Conference was held, the 
euro area seemed to be saved, speculation had calmed down, but 
growth had not resumed and southern economies were remaining 
depressed without clear improvements prospects. Was the euro area 
saved at the expense of member states? 
A variety of analyses were expressed at the EUROFRAME Confer-
ence, like in the EU debate:  
— According to some authors, Europe should stick to the original 
Treaty, abolish solidarity mechanisms, prevent the Central bank 
to buy MS government bonds, make it compulsory for govern-
ments to issue bonds on financial markets. But is this consistent 
with the single currency? Do markets have expertise in macroe-
conomic areas? Should euro area countries be considered as 
countries without monetary sovereignty and issuing risky 
public bonds? 
— Other authors consider that Europe should move towards a 
federal Europe, where European authorities would be respon-
sible for fiscal policy at least for the stabilisation component, 
but also more in more in incentives and allocation functions 
(redistribution being so far not considered). This requires more 
democratic instances in the EU and possibly some form of polit-
ical union. But can countries with different economic 
conditions, different economic and structures, be managed 
centrally? The euro area is too heterogeneous. Can each county 
agree to submit its domestic social and economies choices to 
European trade-offs? 
— Some authors consider that public debts should become safe 
assets again, guaranteed by the ECB, within a real economic 
policy coordination process within MS, targeting explicitly full-
employment and the reduction of imbalances in the area. Is 
such a co-ordination a myth? Can a country agree to modify 
explicitly its economic policy objectives so as to help improve 
its partners’ economic situation? Is the lack of trust between EU 
countries too strong to allow each MS to guarantee its partners’ 
public debts? 
— Last, according to some other authors, a single currency cannot 
be shared by too heterogeneous countries; unconditional debt 
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guarantee will be refused by Northern countries, even though it 
is a prerequisite to maintain euro area unity; Europe is unable to 
organise a common but differentiated strategy; that differentials 
accumulated in terms of competitiveness require large exchange 
rate adjustments in Europe. Exchange rates variations should 
remain possible to reflect disparities between MS: strong 
exchange rate falls in southern countries, strong rises in 
northern countries. Each country should face their own respon-
sibilities: Northern countries will have to raise domestic 
demand; Southern economies will have to use their competi-
tiveness gains to rebuild an export-oriented sector. 
Therefore, the advocates of the single currency have to make a 
choice. Can governance in the euro area be designed in a way which 
would strengthen the economic robustness of the area, would give MS 
the rooms for manoeuvre needed within a coordinated economic 
strategy, albeit forbidding both excessive competitiveness gains and 
excessive rises in debts or deficits? How to strengthen the economic 
and monetary union between remaining heterogeneous economies? 
How to bring the economic and financial crisis to an end, with the 
implementation of a euro area governance while allowing member 
states to follow economic policies adapted to their needs? 
EU governance
In “The Fiscal or Bailout Union: Where Is the EU/EMU’s Fiscal Inte-
gration Heading?”, Marek Dabrowski criticises the view according to 
which closer fiscal and political integration is a condition for the 
common currency to survive. The author recalls that the EU is based 
on the principle of subsidiarity. The author refuses fiscal federalism, 
eurobonds or lender of last resort facility, which would lead to moral 
hazard behaviour. The author advocates a return to the Maastricht 
principles:  enforcing fiscal rules, no bail-out and market discipline.
The paper by Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak: “Redemp-
tion?”, recalls that, before, during and after the crisis, euro area 
governance was not satisfactory. The paper shows that the problem is 
not a lack of fiscal discipline in Europe, but general drifts in financial 
capitalism and an inappropriately designed euro area economic policy 
framework (non-guarantee of public debts, no real economic coordi-
nation, and liberal strategies to impose lower social public expenditure 
and structural reforms). EU member states should not be requested to 
pay for past sins through austerity measures, and should not 
strengthen fiscal discipline through rules lacking economic rationale. 
The paper criticizes recent proposals made with a view to improve euro 
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area governance (redemption fund, European debt agency, fiscal feder-
alism). European public debts should become safe assets again, and 
should not be subject to financial markets’ assessment. The paper 
advocates for a full guarantee of government bonds for the member 
states commit to an economic policy coordination process, which 
should target GDP growth and coordinated reduction of imbalances.
The paper by John FitzGerald: “The new EU governance arrange-
ments” recalls that the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact 
were not effective before the crisis. They did not prevent some MS to 
maintain an economic strategy whose drawbacks were revealed by the 
crisis. Some drawbacks of euro area governance were corrected since 
the beginning of the current crisis. However John FitzGerald is critical 
on the methods used to estimate potential output and how they are 
used to assess MS fiscal policies. The author considers that when output 
is significantly below or above potential, a counter-cyclical policy 
should be undertaken at the euro area level, but also that in normal 
times, member states may be able to choose their own fiscal policy. 
The paper by Paolo Onofri and Tsvetomira Tsenova: “Engine for 
European growth and stability” explains that EMU faces a critical 
trilemma: a slow death by asphyxiation, a sudden collapse or a new 
building yard for EMU, which supposes an efficient implantation of 
the banking union, a grace period to enable peripheral countries to 
restructure and contribute to the European recovery, and institutional 
reform to allow public debts to become again risk-free assets.
Fiscal policy in the EU: Some Assessments 
In the paper “Primary balance and debt projections based on 
estimated fiscal reaction functions for euro area countries”, Martin 
Plödt and Claire Reicher use fiscal rules based on estimated fiscal 
policy reactions functions to project the path of public debt and 
primary balances for bigger euro area countries. The paper shows that 
Italy will need an extremely high primary public surplus to succeed to 
rapidly reduce its debt/GDP ratio; the situation is less worrying for 
Germany, Spain and France. A more rigid fiscal rule like the “1/20” 
rule may destabilise the economy, as restrictive fiscal policy may 
increase the debt ratio in the short time. The required policy strongly 
depends on the potential growth projections, which is problematic for 
some countries like Spain (or Ireland or Greece).
The paper by Matti Viren: “How different are the fiscal policy 
effects? Assessing the importance of cyclical situation, policy coordination, 
composition of policy measures and country specific features” uses different 
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methods to estimate fiscal policy effects. It appears that fiscal multi-
pliers depend on countries, are larger for bigger than for smaller 
countries, larger also during economic recessions, and larger for euro 
area generalized policies, especially for smaller countries. These effects 
are to be taken into account when a fiscal coordinated policy in 
considered. 
The paper on “Fiscal consolidation in times of crisis: is the 
sooner really the better?” by Christophe Blot, Marion Cochard, 
Jérôme Creel, Bruno Ducoudré, Danielle Schweisguth, and Xavier 
Timbeau gives a survey of the recent literature which rediscover, after 
the monetarist, rational-expectations, DSGE models counter-revolu-
tions, that the fiscal multiplier is positive, is higher in periods of high 
unemployment and low level of capacity utilisation, higher when a 
zero-lower-bound constrains monetary policy, higher for expenditures 
than for taxes. Using a small model of euro area countries, where the 
multiplier varies according to the output gap, the authors show that 
implementing large fiscal austerity policies in a depressed economic 
context is costly and inefficient. It would have been better to postpone 
fiscal consolidation in the euro area until a period where MS output 
gaps are less negative. However we can note that such a strategy would 
require a strong confidence between the MS, the ECB and financial 
markets: the ECB would have to accept to guarantee MS public debts, 
financial markets would have to refrain from speculating on MS 
commitments to reduce their debt in the future.
Governance and Banking issues
The paper by Maylis Avaro and Henri Sterdyniak: “Banking union: 
a solution to the euro zone crisis?” analyses this new project 
expected to help to solve the euro area crisis. The banking union 
would break the link between the sovereign debt crisis and the 
banking crisis, by asking the ECB to supervise banks, by establishing 
common mechanisms to solve banking crises and to guarantee 
deposits. The article expresses the fears that banking union is a new 
and uncontrolled step towards more technocratic federalism. Struc-
tural choices on the European banking system will be left to the ECB. 
Banks' solvency and ability to lend would depend primarily on their 
capital ratios and thus on financial markets' sentiment. The links 
between the government, firms, households and domestic banks 
would be cut. The paper suggests that banking union should be 
accompanied by the introduction of a tax on financial activity and by 
isolating retail banking activity from risky activities. 
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The paper by Ewa Miklaszewska, Katarzyna Mikołajczyk and 
Małgorzata Pawłowska: “Do safe banks create a safe system? Central 
and Eastern European banks’ perspective” describes banks’ situation in 
the CEE-5. In the CEE-5, banks remained in the traditional model of 
banking intermediation, they were not strongly hit by the financial 
crisis and did not need fundamental restructuring. Nevertheless, the 
banking union will establish complex new rules and regulatory bodies, 
which may increase moral hazard behaviour, bank concentration, 
away from the CEE stable and healthy banking model. 
Macroeconomic issues
Paavo Suni and Vesa Vihriälä, in: “Euro – How big a difference: 
Finland and Sweden in search of macro stability” compare the 
economic developments in Finland (which in the euro area) and Sweden 
(which decided not to join the euro area). It appears that Sweden has 
achieved a better price stability improvement and a better resistance to 
the global shock in 2009-10, due to its independent monetary regime. 
Nevertheless, part of the recent bad performance of the Finnish 
economy is due to a specific factor: the decline of the Nokia cluster. 
The paper by Hubert Gabrisch and Karsten Staehr: “The Euro Plus 
Pact: Competitiveness and external capital flows in the EU coun-
tries” analyses the relationship between competitiveness, trade 
balances and capital flows. Contrary to the prevailing opinion 
according to which competitiveness differentials generate differentials 
in trade balances which should be financed by capital flows, the paper 
gives econometric results showing that there is no obvious causality 
between competitiveness and current accounts, and conclude the 
opposite: countries attracting external capital flows in a monetary 
union will see increases in their wages and prices, and consequently 
competitiveness losses and current account deficits. This leads the 
authors to be critical about the surveillance of unit wage costs intro-
duced in the euro plus pact. Does this mean that wages should have 
risen in Spain (to lower domestic companies’ profitability) and that 
wages should have decreased in Germany?
The paper by Margit Schratzenstaller: “Reform Options for the 
EU’s System of Own Resources” shows that fiscal procedures currently 
used to build the EU budget lead each member state to account for their 
financial rewards only instead of supporting projects benefiting the 
whole EU. This could be corrected via allocating own resources to the 
EU. The paper discusses which taxes could become immediately EU 
based (financial transactions tax, financial activities tax, flight tax, tax 
on carbon dioxide emissions, tax on energy, CIT, VAT).
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Our conclusion
The financial crisis and the debt crisis are major challenges for the 
euro area. There is clearly a need to improve euro area governance. 
Several mechanisms have been introduced since 2010. They failed so far 
to bring the euro area out of recession: they widened disparities between 
member states and among citizens. Europe has become unpopular, is 
seen more and more as running blind and inappropriate austerity poli-
cies, undermining social protection, under technocratic and distant 
governance. We do not think that European construction should be 
abandoned, that it should be weakened in abandoning the single 
currency. But Europe should strengthen as a “champion of world 
governance”, against the domination of finance, promoting the social 
model, and taking the leadership against climate change and favouring 
environmental transition. This cannot be done as long as Europe 
remains a low growth area, leaving southern economies in recession. 
The implementation of a new governance in the euro area requires both 
institutional changes (public debts should become safe assets again, 
economic policies should be truly coordinated) and new targets: growth, 
employment, social standards. This requires restoring a certain degree of 
confidence and solidarity between member states and citizens; 
launching new European big projects, like social Europe or green Europe, 
economic recovery in southern economies, catching up in central and 
eastern countries. Further steps towards a political union may be taken 
only once peoples’ confidence in Europe has been restored. 
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